United States Supreme Court Review of Tenth Circuit Decisions by Law Journal, Denver
Denver Law Review 
Volume 59 
Issue 2 Tenth Circuit Surveys Article 16 
February 2021 
United States Supreme Court Review of Tenth Circuit Decisions 
Denver Law Journal 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
United States Supreme Court Review of Tenth Circuit Decisions, 59 Denv. L.J. 397 (1982). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT REVIEW
OF TENTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS
I. ALLIED CHEMICAL CORP. v. DAIFLON IN.-REVERSED
In Allied Chemical Corp. v. Daifon, Inc. ,I the Supreme Court, in a per
curiam opinion, reversed the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' order granting
a writ of mandamus in Dai#on, Inc. v. Bohanon.2 The Court held that an
erroneous interlocutory order involving the exercise of a district court's dis-
cretion, such as the improper granting of a new trial, will rarely, if ever,
justify the issuance of a writ of mandamus.
3
The case arose out of an antitrust action in the District Court for the
Western District of Oklahoma. 4 The plaintiff, Daiflon, is a small importer of
refrigerant gas who brought an antitrust suit against all domestic manufac-
turers of the gas.5 After a four-week trial, the jury returned a verdict for
Daiflon, awarding it $2.5 million in damages.6 The trial court then granted
the defendants' motion for a new trial. 7 In its rendition of the facts, the
Supreme Court emphasized the trial court's ostensible reason for ordering a
new trial: that it had erred during the course of the trial in certain eviden-
tiary rulings.
8
The Tenth Circuit, however, had refused to accept that the trial judge
actually based his judgment on evidentiary rulings, pointing out that the
trial court never specifically identified which exhibits were erroneously ad-
mitted.9 The court of appeals found that, since the trial judge had refused to
enter the defendant's motion for a directed verdict and had indicated his
belief that liability had been established, his granting of a new trial on the
issue of liability lacked a rational basis. 10 His real reason for granting a new
trial, according to the court of appeals, was his shock at the amount of dam-
ages awarded by the verdict. 1 Thus, his decision to grant a new trial on the
issue of liability invaded the province of the jury and denied Daiflon its sev-
enth amendment right to a jury trial.
1 2
But even if the trial court's decision to grant a new trial was wrong, the
question remained whether the court of appeals should have invoked the
extraordinary remedy of mandamus, or whether it should have allowed the
1. 449 U.S. 33 (1980).
2. 612 F.2d 1249 (10th Cir. 1979).
3. 449 U.S. at 36.
4. Id.




9. 612 F.2d at 1259. In an implied rejoinder to this point, the Supreme Court stated: "A
trial judge is not required to enter supporting findings of facts and conclusions of law when
granting a new trial motion." 449 U.S. at 36 n.3; see FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
10. 612 F.2d at 1259.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1260.
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new trial to proceed to final judgment, and then examine the issue of the
granting of a new trial upon a regular appeal. It was on this question that
the court of appeals and the Supreme Court disagreed.
In support of its issuance of mandamus, the Tenth Circuit relied on
authority that "in exceptional cases involving a clear abuse of discretion or
usurpation of judicial power," the remedy of mandamus is appropriate.
13
The court recognized that the Supreme Court had recently held in Will v.
Calvert Lif Insurance Co. 14 that plain abuse of discretion would not justify
interlocutory review by mandamus, but found that the trial court in this case
had transcended plain abuse of discretion.' 5 The court also discussed the use
of mandamus as a means of supervision, implying that it meant to employ
mandamus in this case to rein in a wayward trial court.'
6
The court of appeals noted three federal cases in which mandamus had
been used to reverse an order granting a new trial.' 7 However, the court's
use of the reasoning of these cases was not persuasive, as each is distinguisha-
ble from Daflon; in these cases mandamus issued because of some specific
violation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the trial court's granting
a new trial.18
The classic statement of the appropriate grounds for the use of manda-
mus is in Roche v. Evaporated Milk Assoct'ation:'9 mandamus shall issue only "to
confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or
to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so."' 2a Citing
Roche, Chief Justice Warren, in Will v. United States,21 commented that courts
had never confined themselves to a technical meaning of "jurisdiction" in
interpreting the Roche standard, but that it was a "semantic fallacy" to argue
that a district court judge lacked the power to enter an order that was
merely erroneous.
Thus, the question in the Daijlon case was whether the trial judge's be-
havior was outside his power. The Supreme Court held that it was not. Re-
ferring to a case in which it had held that, for mandamus to issue, a litigant's
right to mandamus must be "clear and indisputable, '22 the Court stated:
"the authority to grant a new trial, moreover, is confided almost entirely to
the exercise of discretion on the part of the trial court. Where a matter is
committed to discretion, it cannot be said that a litigant's right to a particu-
lar result is 'clear and indisputable.' "23
13. Id. at 1254 (citing Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Holland, 349 U.S. 379 (1953)).
14. 437 U.S. 655 (1978).
15. 612 F.2d at 1255.
16. 612 F.2d at 1254.
17. Id. at 1257. The three cases are Peterman v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co.,
493 F.2d 88 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 417 U.S. 947 (1974); Grace Lines, Inc. v. Motley, 439 F.2d
1028 (2d Cir. 1971); Kanatser v. Chrysler Corp., 199 F.2d 610 (10th Cir. 1952), cert. denied 344
U.S. 921 (1953).
18. 612 F.2d at 1257.
19. 319 U.S. 21 (1943).
20. Id. at 26.
21. 389 U.S. 90, 103-04 (1967).
22. United States v. Duell, 172 U.S. 576, 582 (1899).
23. 449 U.S. at 36.
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Following the traditional analysis, as exemplified by Roche and Will v.
United States, the Supreme Court seemed to be saying that "clear abuse of
discretion" is not the correct standard for determining whether mandamus
should issue. Rather, the proponent of mandamus must show an abuse of
indiscretion: in other words, an order by a trial judge which he had no dis-
cretion to enter. In the case of this kind of order-for example, a trial court's
violation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in granting a new trial-it
could be argued that the trial court was acting outside its power, and thus
the traditional standard would be satisfied.
In addition, the Supreme Court emphasized that mandamus in this case
violated the strong Congressional policy opposing "piecemeal review," and
stated that Daiflon had an adequate means of relief through the normal
appellate process.24 The Court thus implied that the inconvenience to
Daiflon of a new trial, without more, would not constitute a harm great
enough to justify circumvention of the normal appellate process. 25
Justices Blackmun and White dissented from the per curiam opinion, ex-
pressing dissatisfaction with the majority's peremptory handling of the
case.
26
The Daifon case is part of the Court's general trend toward restricting
opportunities for interlocutory review.2 7 The court is apparently proceeding
from the premise that piecemeal review wastes judicial resources. Though
the Court's decision in Daiflon was correct under traditional mandamus anal-
ysis, perhaps it should more closely examine whether, in this kind of case,
judicial resources can better be conserved by allowing interlocutory review
to avoid the repetition of lengthy jury trials in complex cases.
Neal Richardson
II. COMMUNITY COMMUNICA TIONS Co. v CITY OF BOULDER-REVERSED
In Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder,28 the United States
Supreme Court reversed a Tenth Circuit decision 29 in which the court of
appeals had declared that the City of Boulder was immune from antitrust
liability under the Sherman Act.
30
In 1964, the Boulder City Council granted Community Communica-
tion Company's (CCC) predecessor a twenty-year, revocable, nonexclusive
permit to operate a cable television business in the city. The permit was
24. Id.
25. Cf. 612 F.2d at 1254.
26. 449 U.S. at 37.
27. Set Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978), restricting the application of
the "death knell" doctrine.
28. 50 U.S.L.W. 4144 (1982). Justice Brennan wrote the majority opinion, joined by Jus-
tices Marshall, Blackmun, Powell and Stevens. Justice Stevens filed a special concurrence, and
Justice Rehnquist dissented, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice O'Connor. Justice
White did not participate.
29. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
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assigned to CCC in 1966. Since then CCC has provided cable television
service to the University Hill area of the city, an area where approximately
twenty percent of the city's residents live and where for geographic reasons
broadcast television signals cannot be received well. Because of limited tech-
nology, CCC's service was restricted to the retransmission of Denver and
Cheyenne broadcasts. When improved technology enabled CCC to offer
substantially more entertainment than could be provided by local broadcast
television, CCC informed the city council that it planned to expand into
other areas of the city. At approximately the same time, newly formed Boul-
der Communications Company informed the council of its interest in ob-
taining a permit to provide competing cable service in the city. 3'
The city council responded by enacting an emergency ordinance
prohibiting CCC from expanding its business into other areas of the city for
three months. The city planned during the moratorium to draft a model
cable television ordinance and to invite new businesses to enter the Boulder
market. The purpose of the moratorium was to prevent the expansion of
CCC during the drafting of the model ordinance because it was feared that
such expansion would discourage potential competitors from entering the
market. 32 When the CCC continued building, city authorities arrested
CCC's construction crews and tore down its cables.
33
CCC filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado seeking a preliminary injunction and alleging that the city's re-
striction on CCC's expansion was a violation of section 1 of the Sherman
Act. 34 The district court held that the state action exemption of Parker v.
Brown35 was not available to Boulder, and therefore the city was subject to
antitrust liability. 36 The city appealed, and a divided panel of the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the city was immune
from antitrust liability under Parker.
37
31. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4144-45.
32. Id. at 4145.
33. 630 F.2d at 710 (Markey, C.J., dissenting) (sitting by designation).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). This section states that "[elvery contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States . . . is declared to be illegal."
35. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
36. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 485 F. Supp. 1035 (D. Colo.
1980).
37. 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980). For a thorough discussion of the proceedings in the
lower courts and a discussion of the state action exemption, see Antitrust, Seventh Annual Tenth
Circuit Survey, 58 DEN. L.J. 249 (1981). See also Kennedy, Of Lawyers, Lighibuihs and Raisins: An
Analysis of te State Action DoctrIne under the Antitrust Laws, 74 Nw. U. L. REV. 31 (1979).
During the pendency of this appeal, Boulder decided on a districting plan whereby more
than one cable company will be operating in Boulder. The district court granted CCC another
preliminary injunction against what had become for CCC a permanent geographic limitation.
The district court granted the injunction on both Sherman Act and first amendment grounds.
Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 496 F. Supp. 823 (D. Colo. 1980). The
court of appeals held that to the extent the lower court grounded its order on the Sherman Act,
it erred because of the Tenth Circuit's earlier opinion. Community Communications Co. v.
City of Boulder, No. 80-1882, slip op. at 9 (10th Cir. Sept. 22, 1981). The court of appeals
reversed on the first amendment claim, holding that the district court erred in summarily apply-
ing the first amendment principles governing newspapers to cable operators. Id. at 15. The
appellate court remanded to the district court for a determination of whether cable television's
[Vol. 59:2
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The question facing the Supreme Court in Community Communica-
tions' appeal from the Tenth Circuit decision was whether Boulder was im-
mune from liability under Parker and its progeny. In Parker, the Supreme
Court was called upon to determine the validity of a program adopted by
the State of California that sought to restrict competition in the state's raisin
industry and prevented raisin producers from freely distributing their raisins
through private channels. 38 The Parker Court held that the program was
exempt from the antitrust laws, stating:
We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its his-
tory which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its
officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature. In a
dual system of government in which, under the Constitution, the
states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally
subtract from their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a
state's control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attrib-
uted to Congress.
39
For over three decades the Supreme Court did not elaborate on its view
of state immunity from antitrust liability. Then, in 1975, in Goldfarb v. Vir-
ginia State Bar40 the Court struck down a minimum fee schedule established
by the Fairfax County Bar Association. The Court held that the threshold
requirement for establishing antitrust immunity under Parker is that the ac-
tivity must be required by the state in its sovereign capacity; immunity is
permitted only if the action was in fact compelled, rather than merely au-
thorized, by the state.41 Because the State of Virginia did not require mini-
mum fee schedules, the bar association enjoyed no immunity.
The following year, the Supreme Court was again faced with a state
action question. In Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co. ,42 the Court held that a public
utility's policy of dispensing free light bulbs to consumers of electricity was
subject to the antitrust laws. The Court stated that, in the absence of a state
policy regarding the regulation of the distribution of light bulbs, approval by
the Michigan Public Service Commission of the tariffs containing the distri-
bution was not a sufficient basis for immunity.
4 3
In Bates v. State Bar of Ari ona,4 4 the Supreme Court for the first time
since Parker granted a defendant immunity on state action grounds. At issue
was a state disciplinary rule prohibiting advertising by lawyers. Because the
rule was an "affirmative command of the Arizona Supreme Court,' 45 and
because the Arizona Supreme Court was given authority to govern the legal
profession by the state constitution, the court sustained the State Bar's claim
of immunity.
"unique attributes" warrant, under the first amendment, the type of regulation the city seeks to
impose. Id. at 24.
38. 317 U.S. at 344-48.
39. Id. at 350-51.
40. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
41. Id. at 790.
42. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
43. Id. at 598.
44. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
45. Id. at 360.
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In 1978, the Supreme Court addressed the applicability of the Parker
doctrine to municipalities. In City of Lafayette V. Louisiana Power &Light Co. ,46
the Court rejected the proposition that cities were automatically entitled to
the Parker exemption. The issue in the case was whether two Louisiana cit-
ies, which owned and operated electric utility systems, could be held liable
under the Sherman Act for offenses allegedly committed in the conduct of
their utility systems. A plurality applied a test for immunity based upon the
authorization by the state of the challenged conduct. According to the plu-
rality, municipal conduct is shielded from the antitrust laws if the conduct is
engaged in "pursuant to state policy to displace competition with regulation
or monopoly public service."'47 This state policy must be "clearly articulated
and affirmatively expressed."'48 The plurality opinion stated:
Cities are not themselves sovereign; they do not receive all the fed-
eral deference of the States that create them. Parker's limitation of
the exemption to "official action directed by a state" is consistent
with the fact that the States' subdivisions generally have not been
treated as equivalents of the States themselves. In light of the seri-
ous economic dislocation which could result if cities were free to
place their own parochial interests above the Nation's economic
goals reflected in the antitrust laws, we are especially unwilling to
presume that Congress intended to exclude anticompetitive munic-
ipal action from their reach.
4 9
Chief Justice Burger concurred in the judgment on the basis that the anti-
trust laws should reach municipal action when the city is acting in a proprie-
tary capacity, but not when it is acting in its governmental capacity.
Because the City of Lafayette was engaged in the business of a public utility,
the Chief Justice would not allow them an exemption.
5 0
In Community Communi ations, the Court held that Boulder's moratorium
could not be exempt from the antitrust laws unless it constituted either the
action of the State of Colorado or municipal action in furtherance of "clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy. 15 ' Boulder argued that
these conditions were met because of its status as a home rule city.52 Because
home rule cities in Colorado have "every power theretofore possessed by the
legislature . . . in local and municipal affairs,"153 Boulder argued that its
46. 435 U.S. 389 (1978). Seegenerall Kletzke, Antitrust Liability ofMuni'pal Corporatons. The
Per Se Rules vs. The Rule of Reason-A Reasonable Compromise, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 253; Rogers,
Municipal Antitrtst Liabiliy in a Federalist System, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 305; Rose, Municipal Antitrst
Liability, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 245.
47. 435 U.S. at 413.
48. Id. at 410. A majority of the Court later adopted this test in California Retail Liquor
Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980).
49. Id. at 412-13 (citations omitted).
50. Id. at 422.
51. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4146-47.
52. Id. at 4147. The Colorado Home Rule Amendment gives cities and towns having a
population of two thousand inhabitants the power to enact ordinances relating to local matters
which "supersede within territorial limits and other jurisdiction of said city or town any law of
the state in conflict therewith." CoLO. CONST. art. xx, § 6.
53. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4147 (quoting Denver Urban Renewal Authority v. Byrne, 618 P.2d
1374, 1381 (Colo. 1980), quoting Four-County Metropolitan Capital Improvement Dist. v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 149 Colo. 284, 294, 369 P.2d 67, 72 (1962) (emphasis in original)).
[Vol. 59:2
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
ordinance was an act of government performed by the city acting as the state
in local matters.5 4 The Court rejected this argument, stating that the city
misconceived both the letter and the spirit of the law. The Court stated that
"[o]urs is a 'dual system of government,' which has no place for sovereign
cities," 55 and quoted the dissent in the court of appeals as stating "[wie are a
nation not of 'city-states' but of States."
'56
The Court couched its opinion in terms of legislative intent, stating that
[w]hen Parker examined Congress' intentions in enacting the anti-
trust laws, the opinion noted that 'nothing in the language of the
Sherman Act or in its history. . . suggests that its purpose was to
restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its
legislature . . . . [And] an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's
control over its ofjiers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Con-
gress.' Thus Parker recognized Congress' intention to limit the state
action exemption based upon the federalism principle of limited
state sovereignty.
57
The Court's argument is misleading in two respects. First, it suggests that
Congress, when it passed the Sherman Act, intended to exempt state, but not
municipal, action. Given the extremely narrow definition of "interstate
commerce" at the turn of the century, 58 it is more likely that it never oc-
curred to Congress that the Act might one day be applied to government
action. Second, the majority opinion suggests that the Parker Court intended
to exclude municipal action from the exemption it created. That message
from the Parker opinion is not as clear as the majority implies. The Parker
Court stated, in examining the legislative history of the Act, that "[tihe spon-
sor of the bill . .. declared that it prevented only 'business combina-
tions.' 59 The Parker Court continued, stating that the purpose of the
Sherman Act "was to suppress combinations to restrain competition and at-
tempts to monopolize by btdividuals and corporations ,"6 and "we have no ques-
tion of the state or its munic'pality becoming a participant in a private
agreement or combination by others for restraint of trade .... ",61 The
Parker opinion simply does not support the conclusion that the Parker Court
intended to limit the scope of the exclusion.
The City of Boulder also argued that the ordinance constituted action
undertaken pursuant to a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed
state policy, contending that by virtue of the Colorado Home Rule Amend-
54. The Court assumed, without deciding, that the ordinance fell within the scope of the
power delegated to the city by virtue of the Colorado Home Rule Amendment, that is, that the
regulation of cable television is a local matter. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4147 n. 16.
55. Id. (quoting Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. at 351) (emphasis added by Community Communica-
tions Court).
56. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4147 (quoting Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 630 F.2d at
717 (Markey, CJ., dissenting)).
57. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4147 (emphasis added by Community Communications Court) (citations
omitted).
58. See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1896) (sugar trust not engaged
in interstate commerce).
59. 317 U.S. at 351 (citing Cong. Rec. 2562, 2457).
60. 317 U.S. at 351 (emphasis added).
61. Id. at 351-52 (emphasis added).
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ment's guarantee of local autonomy Colorado has granted to Boulder the
power to enact the moratorium ordinance and that the legislature contem-
plated the kind of action complained of. 6 2 The Court held, however, that
the requirement of "clear articulation and affirmative expression" is not sat-
isfied by neutrality on the part of the state, stating that acceptance of the
proposition that a general grant of power to enact ordinances constitutes
state authorization to enact anticompetitive ordinances would "wholly evis-
cerate" the concepts of "clear articulation and affirmative expression" re-
quired by the Court's earlier precedents.
63
The Court went on to say that the mere finding that the Parker exemp-
tion was not available to the city did not mean that the same antitrust rules
that now apply to private persons would apply to cities. The Court stated
that "[i]t may be that certain activities, which might appear anticompetitive
when engaged in by private parties, take on a different complexion when
adopted by a local government. '"64
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Rehnquist described the majority's deci-
sion as a "novel and egregious error"65 and expressed concern that it would
"impede, if not paralyze" 66 the efforts of local governments to protect the
public health, safety, and welfare.
The dissent argued that the majority erred in characterizing the Parker
decision as one involving exemption from the Sherman Act, arguing instead
that it involved preemption. Because the presumptions utilized in exemption
analysis are quite different from those used in preemption analysis, the dis-
sent argued that failure to distinguish between the two led the Court to the
wrong conclusion. According to Justice Rehnquist, preemption analysis in-
volves "the interplay between the enactments of two different sovereigns-
one federal and the other state."'6 7 Under the supremacy clause, 68 when
there is a conflict between the laws of the federal government and those of a
state or local government, 69 or where the federal government has occupied a
field exclusively, the state or local enactment must fall. Because of federal-
ism concerns, there is a presumption against preemption that can be over-
come only by a clear manifestation by Congress of an intention that the
federal act should supersede the police powers of the state.70
Justice Rehnquist argued that exemption, on the other hand, does not
involve the interplay of enactments of different jurisdictions, but rather the
interplay of enactments of a single sovereign. The question under exemption
62. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4147.
63. Id. at 4147-48.
64. Id. at 4148 n.20.
65. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4152 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 4149.
67. Id. (quoting Handler, Antitnst - 1978, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1363, 1379 (1978)).
68. U.S. CONST. art vi, cl. 2, states in pertinent part:
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursu-
ance thereof. . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land ....
69. The Supreme Court has never made a distinction between states and their subdivisions
with regard to the preemptive effects of federal law. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4151 (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting). See City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973); Huron
Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
70. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4149 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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analysis is whether one law was intended to relieve a party from the necessity
of complying with a prior enactment, and the presumption is that there was
no such intent.7 '
The dissent predicted a number of problems to be encountered in the
future due to the majority's application of the antitrust laws to municipali-
ties. These problems include a determination of whether the per se rules of
illegality 72 will apply to municipal defendants in the same manner as they
are applied to private defendants, and whether cities will be liable for treble
damages for enacting anticompetitive ordinances.7 3 The major problem
foreseen by the dissent, however, is the application of the "rule of reason" to
municipalities. Under the rule of reason, as applied to private defendants,
restraints may be defended only on the basis that the restraint has no unrea-
sonable effect on competition or that its pro-competitive effects outweigh its
anticompetitive effects. 74 For example, in National Society of Professi'onal Engi-
neers o. United Slates,75 which dealt with a provision in the Society's ethical
code prohibiting competitive bidding, the Court held that an anticompeti-
tive restraint could not be defended on the basis of a private party's conclu-
sion that competition is itself unreasonable. The Communit Communt'at'ons
dissent questioned whether the same rule would apply to municipalities, that
is, whether municipalities would be foreclosed from arguing that the benefits
to the health, safety, and public welfare outweigh the anticompetitive effects
of the ordinance. Justice Rehnquist stated that "[i]f municipalities are per-
mitted only to enact ordinances that are consistent with the pro-competitive
policies of the Sherman Act, a municipality's power to regulate the economy
would be all but destroyed."
76
On the other hand, he argued, if the rule of reason were modified to
permit a municipality to defend its regulation on the ground that its benefits
to the community outweigh its anticompetitive effects, the Court would be
called upon to engage in the same wide-ranging, standardless inquiry into
local regulation that it did during the Lochner era.
77
If the problem were analyzed as one of preemption rather than one of
exemption, argued the dissent, these problems would be avoided. 78 Instead
of a sweeping review by federal courts, the courts would be confronted with
the simpler question of whether the ordinance enacted is preempted by the
Sherman Act. Moreover, because a municipality does not violate the anti-
trust laws when it enacts legislation preempted by the Sherman Act, deter-
71. Id.
72. Under the per se rules, some kinds of conduct are considered unreasonable as a matter
of law, and there will be no inquiry into their reasonableness. United States v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (price fixing).
73. Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides that "any person who shall be injured in his
business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws . ..shall recover
threefold the damages by him sustained." 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
74. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
75. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
76. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4151 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
77. During the "Lochner era," the Supreme Court invalidated a great amount of social and
economic legislation on the ground that it violated the due process clause. See, e.g., Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
78. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4151 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
19821
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mining the remedy is not a problem-the preempted legislation is simply
invalid and unenforceable.
Finally, the dissent warned that the majority's decision effectively de-
stroys the "home rule movement," through which local governments have
garnered some autonomy over matters of local concern. 79 The impact of this
decision will be felt most by those municipalities having the greatest auton-
omy because they will be least able to avail themselves of the protective
mantle of the state.
The impact of this case is far from certain, and the resolution of the
problems forecasted by the dissent will not be simple. Perhaps a better reso-
lution of the case would have been to adopt the preemption analysis of the
dissent in Community Communications and Chief Justice Burger's concurrence
in City of Lafayette, in which he argued for a distinction between proprietary
and governmental functions.8 0 Under this analysis, municipal activity is not
subject to the antitrust laws if the activity is governmental and not pre-
empted; municipal activity is subject to the antitrust laws if the municipality
is engaging in proprietary activity or governmental activity that is
preempted.
Local governments should not be hamstrung in their ability to protect
the health, safety, and public welfare of their citizens; nor should they, when
engaging in a proprietary activity, be permitted to avail themselves of an
"exemption" from the antitrust laws, thereby putting themselves in a posi-
tion superior to that of their private competitors. In the absence of a clear
manifestation by Congress of an intent to preempt local government action,
such action should not be subject to the antitrust laws.
Kingsly R. Browne
III. MITCHELL v D.R. -VACATED AND REMANDED
In Mitchellv. D.R. ,81 the Supreme Court vacated and remanded for fur-
ther consideration in light of Harris v. McRae8 2 and Williams v. Zbaraz,8 3 the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in D.R. v. Mitchell.8 4 The court
had held that a Utah statute,8 5 which prohibited the expenditure of public
assistance funds for abortions except where the operation was necessary to
79. Id. at 4152.
80. Admittedly, this is not always a clear distinction. For example, in the Tenth Circuit's
Commumni Communziations decision, the majority felt that the regulation of cable television was
an exercise of governmental authority, 630 F.2d at 707, while the dissent claimed that the ordi-
nances are, "in fact and intent," contracts, reflecting a proprietary interest. 630 F.2d at 719
(Markey, CJ., dissenting). The city was not, however, engaging in the operation of a cable televi-
sion business, in which case it would be involved in proprietary activity; instead, it was involved
in the regulaiton of the cable television business, a governmental activity.
81. 449 U.S. 808 (1980).
82. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
83. 448 U.S. 358 (1980).
84. 617 F.2d 203 (10th Cir. 1980).
85. Utah Code Ann. § 55-15a-3 (Supp. 1979).
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preserve the mother's life, was unconstitutional. Three Supreme Court Jus-
tices86 dissented and adopted the reasoning set forth in the dissenting opin-
ions of Harris and Wilh;ams. On remand, the Tenth Circuit8 7 affirmed the
district court's decision,8 8 concluding that the Utah statute restricting abor-
tion funding did not deny the plaintiff equal protection and due process of
law.
At the time the abortion was sought, the plaintiff, an unmarried mother
of one, was a recipient of Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC),89 a program which entitled the plaintiff to receive medical care
under the Medicaid Assistance Program. °' Upon discovering her preg-
nancy, the plaintiff consulted with her doctor about securing an abortion
and the doctor determined that an abortion was appropriate medical treat-
ment.9 ' Thereafter, plaintiff attempted but was denied admittance to the
University of Utah Medical Center on the grounds that the Center would
not be reimbursed for services rendered because of a recently enacted Utah
statute.
92
The Utah statute provision for abortion funding is similar to the fund-
ing criteria established by the Medicaid Assistance Program as amended by
the "Hyde Amendment." 93 In addition to providing funding for abortions
where a mother's life is endangered, the legislative policy of the Utah law
indicates that funding should be given for cases of rape and incest.
94
The plaintiff brought an action in federal district court seeking to estab-
lish that the Utah law is unconstitutional and that an abortion is medical
treatment which the plaintiff was entitled to receive under the appropriate
statutes and regulations. 95 The trial court disagreed, holding that the Utah
statute does provide public assistance for abortions which are therapeutic,
and that the standard for determining when an abortion is therapeutic is
clearly articulated. 96 After reviewing recent Supreme Court decisions, 97 the
trial court concluded that a state has the power to favor childbirth over
abortions by the allocation of funds so long as the state's action does not
directly interfere with a protected activity. Therefore, the statute, which
does favor childbirth by limiting abortion funding to cases where a mother's
86. 449 U.S. 808 (Blackmun, Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
87. D. R. v. Michell, 645 F.2d 852 (10th Cir. 1981).
88. 456 F. Supp. 609 (D. Utah 1978).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1976).
90. Id. § 1396.
91. 456 F. Supp. at 610.
92. Utah Code Ann. § 55-15a-3 (Supp. 1979).
93. The Hyde Amendment is an appropriation measure passed each year since 1977 under
which Congress has restricted the use of federal funds to certain types of necessary abortions.
Departments of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare Appropriations Act, 1977, Pub. L.
No. 95-205, § 101, 95 Stat. 1460.
94. This policy would authorize expenditures in cases where the Hyde Amendment, de-
pending on the year in question, does not provide federal reimbursement. See 456 F. Supp. at
625 n.2.
95. 456 F. Supp. 609 (D. Utah 1978).
96. I. at 623. In the court's opinion, therapeutic abortion means an abortion which is
necessary to save a mother's life. Id.




life is endangered but which does not prevent a woman from exercising her
right to have an abortion, is valid.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the trial court's
interpretation of therapeutic was too narrow, since "therapeutic" can in-
clude abortions necessary to preserve a mother's health--even though her
life may not be endangered. 98 The court noted that the Supreme Court
cases relied upon by the trial court related to nontherapeutic abortions and
did not address the issue of which abortions are actually included in the term
therapeutic.
The Supreme Court, in a memorandum decision, vacated and re-
manded the court of appeals' decision in light of two recent opinions. 99 In
Harris v. McRae ioo the Supreme Court held in part that provisions governing
the Medicaid Assistance Program 1° ' do not require states to fund certain
types of abortions for which federal reimbursement is unavailable. The
Court further noted that restrictive federal funding for abortions does not
impinge upon a woman's choice to terminate her pregnancy, and therefore
does not violate the due process and equal protection clauses of the fifth
amendment. Four Justices dissented, ' 0 2 concluding that the state's interest
in protecting potential life does not justify excluding needy women from ob-
taining medical assistance for medically necessary abortions which may in-
clude instances other than where the mother's life is endangered. The
restrictions place on abortion funding, therefore, are invalid.
A companion case to Harrs, Williams v. Zbaraz,10 3 addressed the issue of
whether an Illinois statute prohibiting medical assistance for abortions, ex-
cept for those abortions where the mother's life is endangered, violates the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme Court
adopted the reasoning stated in Hars and held that a state does not have to
provide public funding for medically necessary abortions when federal reim-
bursement is unavailable. The Court also found that the Illinois statute does
not deny a plaintiff equal protection of the law, even though it provides
medical assistance for medically necessary procedures generally but not for
medically necessary abortions. Four Justices dissented, 1° 4 and adopted the
dissenting opinion of Hams.
On remand, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's decision wherein the court had held that the Utah statute did not
deny the plaintiff due process and equal protection of the law. '0 5 The plain-
tiff on the second appeal, however, contended that the statute violated the
supremacy clause because Utah's eligibility requirements are stricter than
those under the federal statute. The court of appeals dismissed the claim,
finding that the class for which the plaintiff argued had never been properly
98. 617 F.2d 203 (10th Cir. 1980).
99. Mitchellv. D. R., 101 S. Ct. 53 (1980).
100. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1976).
102. 448 U.S. 297, 329, 349 (Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
103. 448 U.S. 358 (1980).
104. Id. at 370 (Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
105. 645 F.2d at 853.
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certified by the trial court. The appeal, therefore, was dismissed.' 0 6
Nancy L. Cohen
IV. MERRION v. JICARILLA APACfiE TRIBE-AFFIRMED
In Merion v. Jican'lla Apache Tribe, 10 7 the United States Supreme Court
affirmed a 1980 Tenth Circuit decision wherein the court of appeals recog-
nized the right of Indian tribes to impose a mineral severance tax on non-
Indians producing oil and gas under leases on executive-order reservation
lands.' 08 The Court, in its lengthy opinion, generally adopted the reasoning
of the court of appeals. The economic repurcussions of this significant deci-
sion will be felt throughout the western United States.
The Jicarilla Apache tribe resides on an executive-order Indian reserva-
tion in northwestern New Mexico.' 0 9 Pursuant to the tribe's constitution,
10
which provides that the tribal council may enact ordinances to govern the
development of tribal lands and natural resources, the tribal council adopted
an ordinance imposing a severance tax on oil and gas production from tribal
lands.II' The Secretary of the Interior approved this ordinance in 1976.112
Petitioners, operating under federal leases granted prior to enactment of
the ordinance, produced oil and gas from wells located on the Jicarilla
Apache tribe's reservation. In federal district court, these lessees sued the
tribe and the Secretary of the Interior seeking a declaratory judgment and
an injunction that would prohibit enforcement of the severance tax. After
making findings of fact, the trial judge held that: 1) neither tribal sover-
eignty nor federal legislation empowered the Jicarilla Apaches to enact the
tax; 2) Congress granted to the State of New Mexico the exclusive right to
106. Id. at 854.
107. 50 U.S.L.W. 4169 (1982). Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice
Stevens, with whom the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist joined, filed a dissenting opinion.
108. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537 (10th Cir. 1980) (en banc). Judge
Logan delivered the opinion of the court of appeals, 617 F.2d at 539, with Judge McKay spe-
cially concurring, 617 F.2d at 549. Chief Judge Seth filed a dissenting opinion, 617 F.2d at 551,
as did Judge Barrett, 617 F.2d at 556. For a thoughtful analysis of the Tenth Circuit's opinion,
see Lands and Natural Resources, Seventh Annual Tenth Cirait Survy, 58 DEN. LJ. 415,416-22 (1981).
109. The Jicarilla Apache reservation was established in 1887 by the executive order of
President Cleveland. The Court noted that the fact that the reservation was established by
executive order rather than by treaty or statute should not affect the analysis because an Indian
tribe's sovereign power is not affected by the manner in which its reservatioi was created. 50
U.S.L.W. at 4170 n.l.
110. The Jicarilla Apache tribe is organized under the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,
ch. 576, § 16, 48 Stat. 987, 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1976), which authorizes any tribe residing on the
same reservation to organize for its common welfare and to adopt a constitution and bylaws,
subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior. The tribe's first constitution was ap-
proved by the Secretary in 1937, and a revised constitution was approved in 1968.
111. The tax is imposed on lessees of mineral leases on the reservation at the time of sever-
ance. The tax rate, assessed at the wellhead per barrel of crude oil and per million Btu of
natural gas sold or transported off of the reservation, is payable monthly. Oil and gas received





impose severance taxes on minerals extracted from executive-order reserva-
tions; and 3) the tax discriminated against and constituted a multiple bur-
den on interstate commerce in violation of the commerce clause.,
13
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, reversed the deci-
sion of the lower federal court." 4 Writing for the majority, Judge Logan
determined that the tribe has "the inherent power to levy a privilege tax on
the occupation of severing oil and gas from reservation land even though the
tax falls on nonmembers." ' 1 5 In a scholarly review of the law, Judge Logan
discussed the limitations imposed upon Indian tribal sovereignty by the fed-
eral government." 6 The court of appeals resolved that Indian tribes may
act only when such action does not impinge upon the superior rights and
interests of the United States. Finding that the Jicarilla Apache's mineral
severance tax did not interfere with any federal right, 1 7 the court of appeals
concluded that the taxing power was one of those inherent attributes of sov-
ereignty retained by the Indian tribe."18
In finding that taxation is an inherent power retained by the Indians,
the Tenth Circuit was persuaded by Supreme Court decisions holding that
the tribe's retained powers have at least some elements of territoriality., 19
113. Id. at 540.
114. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537 (10th Cir. 1980) (en banc). See note
108 supra.
115. 617 F.2d at 544. The Tenth Circuit was in accord with the trial court's finding that no
treaty or act of Congress specifically authorizes the Jicarilla Apache's imposition of the sever-
ance tax. Id. at 541.
116. Id. The Court recognized that although Indian tribes were once self-governing polit-
ical nations, they no longer possess the full attributes of sovereignty. Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978); The Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
As a consequence, certain powers are denied to the tribes because exercise of these powers would
infringe upon the superior rights of the federal government. Se, e.g., Johnson and Graham's
Lessee v.M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) (Indian tribes, though rightful occupants of
the soil, may not convey it at their will, superior title having vested in the United States); The
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17-18 (1831) (Indian tribes may not deal with
foreign nations because of the interest of the United States in protecting its external bounda-
ries); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (Indian tribes have surrendered
the power to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians because of the overriding interest of
the United States in protecting its citizens from unwarranted intrusions on their personal
liberty).
117. 617 F.2d at 541-52. The court of appeals determined that the federal taxing power was
in no way impinged by the Indian's tax, reasoning that the federal government can tax non-
Indians or Indians within the reservation regardless ofwhether the tribe levies the severance tax.
Id. Neither did the tax violate the protections afforded by the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments, because, in the court's opinion, the tax was not so severe as to constitute a deprivation of
property. Id at 542.
118. The Tenth Circuit recognized that the Indian tribes possess certain inherent powers of
self-government. Significantly, the court of appeals found that the Indian tribes' powers are
retained, ie., they are derived from the tribes' original status as independent sovereign nations.
E.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1978). The majority of the court of ap-
peals rejected the contention that the Jicarilla Apache tribe's authority to act was dependent
upon affirmative enabling legislation by Congress. 617 F.2d at 542. Such a conclusion is consis-
tent with the Supreme Court's determination that Indian tribes are much more than private,
voluntary associations. See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975). But see 617 F.2d
at 553-54 (Seth, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the Jicarilla Apache tribe's property rights were
little different from those of any other socio-religious group).
119. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (state court without jurisdiction to hear action
brought by nonmember against an Indian concerning contract formed on the reservation);
Johnson and Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) (voluntary transac-
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The court of appeals reasoned that such territoriality permits the tribes to
levy a tax that falls upon nonmembers doing business on the reservation,
particularly when the nonmembers are extracting and removing mineral re-
sources from Indian territory.' 20 Moreover, the court of appeals found im-
plicit congressional approval of this territoriality concept in regard to
taxation. Judge Logan noted that Congress was aware of an Eighth Circuit
decision upholding the right of Indian tribes to impose taxes upon non-Indi-
ans doing business within Indian reservations 12' when it set forth the sover-
eign powers of the tribes in section 16 of the Indian Reorganization Act of
1934. With such knowledge, Congress made no effort to limit the Indians'
exercise of their taxing power.' 22 Further support for the court of appeals'
interpretation was found in an opinion of the Solicitor of the Department of
the Interior, issued shortly after passage of the 1934 Act, wherein the Solici-
tor concluded that "chief among the powers of sovereignty recognized as
pertaining to an Indian tribe is the power of taxation."'' 2 3 The court of ap-
peals reasoned that this contemporaneous interpretation of the meaning of
section 16 of the 1934 Act, by the agency charged with its enforcement,
should be given great weight.
124
In considering whether the severance tax violates the commerce clause,
the court of appeals determined that although the commerce clause does not
preclude the Indian tribes' power to tax, this constitutional provision limits
the taxation authority of the tribes as well as the states.' 25 The court further
held that the standard to be used in applying the commerce clause to Indian
action is "whether a tribe's tax legislation infringes upon the national inter-
est in maintaining the free flow of interstate trade."' 26 Rejecting the conclu-
sions of the trial court, Judge Logan found that the severance tax did not
discriminate against interstate commerce 2 7 nor did it impose a multiple
tions between nonmembers and members of tribe within the confines of the reservation subject
nonmembers to the laws of the tribe). But see Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S.
191 (1978) (Indian tribes cannot exercise criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers who commit
criminal acts on reservation land).
120. Chief Judge Seth based his dissent upon the particular history of the Jicarilla Apache
tribe and its nomadic nature. 617 F.2d at 551. Judge Seth stated that the Jicarilla Apaches
never exercised territoriality over a specific geographic area and noted that the location in New
Mexico to be occupied by the Jicarilla Apaches changed several times through the promulga-
tion and revocation of executive orders. id. at 553. The Chief Judge therefore concluded that
the Jicarilla Apaches never exercised the territoriality necessary to justify imposition of a sever-
ance tax. Id.
121. Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1905), appeal dmissed, 203 U.S. 599 (1906).
Accord, Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384 (1904); Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 259 F.2d 553
(8th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 932 (1959).
122. 617 F.2d at 544.
123. 55 Interior Dec. 14, 46 (1934).
124. 617 F.2d at 544.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 545.
127. Id. The court found no discrimination in the ordinance's exemption for oil and gas
taken by the tribe as in-kind royalty payments. Judge Logan concluded that subjecting royalty
products received by the tribe to its own tax would be "a fruitless and wasteful act." Id. In
addition, the court perceived no per se discrimination against interstate commerce. The court
stated that "it is settled that an occupation or privilege tax on the mining or severing of natural
resources, although closely connected with interstate commerce, is a local activity properly sub-
ject to local taxation . . . even though the severed product is destined for immediate entry into
19821
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burden on such commerce.'
28
The Tenth Circuit also rejected the district court's determination that
Congress preempted the exercise of the tribe's power to levy a severance tax
by specifically authorizing the states to impose severance taxes on oil and gas
production from executive-order reservations.' 29 The court of appeals ap-
plied the canon that statutes passed for the benefit of the Indian tribes
should be construed liberally, so that all ambiguities are resolved in favor of
the Indians.' 30 Judge Logan found that neither the language nor the legisla-
tive history of the act granting taxing authority to the states evidenced a
congressional intent to preempt tribal taxation.' 3' The court also empha-
sized that despite the comprehensive federal regulation of mineral leasing on
Indian lands, Congress expressly has provided that tribes like the Jicarilla
Apaches may, by proper constitutional and legislative means approved by
the Secretary of the Interior, set terms and conditions for operations of min-
eral leases. 1
32
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the Ji-
carilla Apache tribe has the authority to impose a severance tax on oil and
gas produced from the tribe's reservation lands, and, if so, whether the tax
imposed by the tribe violates the commerce clause. 133 Affirming the decision
of the Tenth Circuit, the Court held that the tribe has the inherent power to
impose the severance tax as a necessary attribute of its powers of self-govern-
ment.' 34 The Supreme Court also ruled that the severance tax did not im-
pose a burden on interstate commerce.'
35
The Court began its reasoning with the assertion that "the power to tax
interstate commerce ... and even though the cost of interstate commerce is increased." Id. at
545-46 (citations omitted).
128. Id. at 546. The court of appeals rejected the lessee's argument that because New Mex-
ico also imposes an oil and gas severance tax, the Jicarilla Apache tribe's tax constitutes a multi-
ple burden on interstate commerce. Judge Logan held that New Mexico's ability to impose an
identical tax on lessees "does not implicate the federal interest in maintaining the flow of inter-
state commerce at all." Id. Rather, the court of appeals raised without deciding the possibility
that, absent the express congressional authorization to the states to tax minerals extracted from
executive-order Indian reservations, New Mexico's tax might interfere with the federal interest
in regulating Indian affairs. Id. *Such dicta may be unsettling to those states imposing severance
taxes on minerals removed from Indian reservations created by statute or treaty because there is
no federal legislation expressly authorizing state taxation of minerals extracted from such In-
dian lands. See Comment, Te Casefor Exrcust'e Tribal Power to Tax Miteral Lessees of Int'an Land,
124 U. PA. L. R. 491, 507 (1975), wherein the author discusses the proposition that state taxa-
tion of Indian reservation mineral lessees is invalid. But see Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas
Co., 336 U.S. 342 (1949), wherein the Court held that states may tax lessees' income derived
from mineral production activities on reservation leaseholds, even though the taxation might
interfere with royalty payments due to the tribe.
129. 617 F.2d at 547-49. 25 U.S.C. § 398c (1976) authorizes the states to impose taxes upon
the mineral output of lessees upon land in executive-order Indian reservations. There is no
similar statutory authorization for state taxation of lessees severing minerals from Indian reser-
vations created by treaty or statute.
130. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976).
131. 617 F.2d at 547. Based upon a study of the legislative history, the court stated that
Congress did not consider the issue of Indian tribal taxation during the passage of the legislation
authorizing state taxation.
132. 25 U.S.C. § 396b (1976).
133. 449 U.S. 820 (1980).
134. 50 U.S.L.W. 4169 (1982).
135. Id. at 4175-76.
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is an essential attribute of Indian sovereignty because it is a necessary instru-
ment of self-government and territorial management."' 36 Justice Marshall,
speaking for the Court, emphasized that the power to tax is not derived
solely from the Indian tribes' power to exclude non-Indians from tribal
lands. 13 7 Agreeing with Judge McKay's observation that the tax is necessary
to enable the tribe to carry out the municipal functions approved and man-
dated by Congress, 1 38 the Court found that lessees who avail themselves of
the governmental services provided by the Indians ought to be required to
contribute through the payment of taxes to the general cost of such
services. 139
Justice Marshall next asserted that even if the tribe's power to tax was
derived solely from its power to exclude non-Indians from the reservation,
the severance tax would be valid.' 40 The Court's rationale for this conclu-
sion was that because the Indians have the power to exclude non-Indians
from reservation lands, they have the lesser power to tax or place other con-
ditions on the non-Indians' conduct or continued presence on the reserva-
tion. Furthermore, the Court found that a non-Indian who enters tribal
jurisdiction remains subject to the risk that the tribe will later exercise its
sovereign power. 14
1
As to the question of whether federal legislation preempts imposition of
the severance tax by the Indians, the Supreme Court was in accord with the
Tenth Circuit's finding that neither federal regulation of leasing on Indian
lands nor the congressional authorization to the states to impose taxes on oil
and gas produced from executive-order reservations deprives the tribe of its
authority to impose the severance tax. 142 Beyond its adoption of the Tenth
Circuit's rationale, 43 the Supreme Court pointed to the fact that Congress
has recognized Indian-imposed taxes as one of the costs that may be recov-
ered under federal energy pricing regulations in support of its conclusion
that imposition of the severance tax would not contravene federal policy or
law. 144
Although the Court concurred with the Tenth Circuit's conclusion that
there was no commerce clause problem with the Jicarilla Apache tribe's sev-
erance tax, Justice Marshall used a different analysis. The Court noted that
state or Indian taxes may violate the "negative implications" of the com-
136. Id. at 4171.
137. Id.
138. 617 F.2d at 550 (McKay, J., concurring).
139. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4171.
140. Ad. at 4173.
141. Id. The Court concluded, therefore, that the fact that the tribe chose not to exercise its
power to tax when it first granted the petitioners' leases did not divest the tribe of its authority
to impose a tax on the severed minerals.
142. Id. at 4174.
143. Id. The Court emphasized that the Secretary of the Interior had approved both the
tribe's constitution, which authorized tribal council regulation of natural resources, and the
severance tax ordinance itself. In the Court's view, this demonstrated federal accord with the
tribe's actions. In addition, the Court approved the Tenth Circuit's reasoning that the act per-
mitting state taxation of mineral leases on executive-order reservations did not divest the tribe
of its taxing power.
144. Id. at 4175.
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merce clause by unduly burdening or discriminating against interstate com-
merce and that judicial review is intended to ensure that such taxes do not
disrupt or burden commerce "when Congress' power remains unexer-
cised."1 4 5 Once Congress acts, however, courts are not free to review state or
Indian regulations. Justice Marshall stated that when Congress has struck
the balance it deems appropriate, the courts are no longer needed to prevent
a burdening of commerce, and "it matters not that the courts would invali-
date the state tax or regulation . . . in the absence of congressional ac-
tion."'146 The Court concluded that Congress has acted affirmatively by
providing a series of federal checkpoints that must be cleared before a tribal
tax can take effect and, in this case, the severance tax was enacted in accord-
ance with this congressional scheme. 147 The Court adjudged that it was im-
proper "to strike down a tax that has traveled through the precise channels
established by Congress, and has obtained the specific approval of the Secre-




147. Id. at 4176.
148. Id. The Court noted that if judicial scrutiny had been warranted in this case, the
severance tax would survive such scrutiny. Id.
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